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More Restrictive Than Necessary:
A Policy Review of Secure Housing Units
ZAFIR SHAIQ*
Introduction
On July 1, 2011, approximately 6,600 men, with no outlet for
their anger and frustration but their own bodies, decided to refuse
food until changes were made to improve their treatment.' The
hunger strike lasted three weeks. 2 Dozens of these men lost twenty
to thirty-five pounds.3 What makes this story extraordinary is that
these men were prisoners in California's secure housing units
("SHU"),4 spread throughout at least thirteen facilities all over the
state.5 For over twenty years the state of California has used SH1Us
to increase prison safety. 6 However, as will be argued in this Note,
not only are these facilities failing to make the prison system safer,
but they are also costly to maintain. Furthermore, SHUs keep the
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6. Keramet Reiter, A Brief History of Pelican Bay, Prisoner Hunger Strike Solidarity
Blog, http://prisonerhungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/pelican-bay/305-2 (last
visited Feb. 27, 2012).
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men in a harsh and injurious environment without providing any
programming to make the prisoners less likely to return to crime
upon release. SHUs are more restrictive than necessary. Only
through understanding how history led to the development of the
SHU and analyzing SHU policies in detail can policymakers develop
a plan to reform the SHU while also maintaining safety.
SHU inmates are kept in complete isolation. They are confined
in their cells upwards of 22.5 hours a day and must even eat and
exercise in seclusion. 7 Additionally they are not allowed any human
contact-even family visits occur through glass.8  Given these
circumstances, it is astonishing that these prisoners were able to find
a way not only to communicate with one another but also to
coordinate a massive collective action that required reaching across
racial and gang lines. The prisoners' demands included ending
collective punishment, eliminating the debriefing policy to remove
the label of "gang member," providing "adequate and nutritious
food," and providing the prisoners with basic programming and
privileges. 9 A representative for the strike summarized the position
when he said:
[W]e have decided to put our fate in our own hands. Some
of us have already suffered a slow, agonizing death in
which the state has shown no compassion toward these
dying prisoners.... No one wants to die. Yet under this
current system of what amounts to intense torture, what
choice do we have? If one is to die, it will be on our own
terms.1 0
Prisoners ended the hunger strike after three weeks on July 21,
2011, after reaching an agreement with the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") to develop plans to review
7. SHARON SHALEV, SUPERMAX: CONTROLLING RISK THROUGH SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT 3 (2009).
8. Id.
9. Demands, PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY BLOG (Apr. 3, 2011),
http://prisonerhungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/the-prisoners-demands-2/.
10. James Crowford & Mutop DuGuya, Why Prisoners are Protesting, PRISONER
HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY BLOG (Oct. 18, 2012 9:52 PM), http://
prisonerhungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/voices-from-inside/why-prisoners-are-
protesting.
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and change some of the SHU policies at issue.11 However, after two
months of waiting for meaningful steps towards change the
prisoners felt CDCR took advantage of their good will and was not
taking adequate action. This resulted in a second hunger strike that
began on September 26, 2011.12 This strike drew in nearly 12,000
prisoners -almost double the number from the first action-
including California prisoners being held outside of California.13
The strike finally ended nearly three weeks later after CDCR
released a memo requiring a review of every SHU prisoner being
held on the basis of gang affiliation.' 4 While it remains to be seen
what lasting effect the strikes will have on CDCR policies, it is
already apparent that the strike unified prisoners, including
members of rival gangs, against the harsh policies of the Department
of Corrections.
Although this note will focus on isolation units in California,
specifically Pelican Bay, similar units exist throughout the country,
and much of the discussion here is equally relevant in those settings.
California is an important case study because it is a leader in the
SHU movement and boasts the largest SHU population of any
state.'5
Part I of this note will discuss the history of isolation and how
prisons have shifted from using short-term isolation as a tool for
rehabilitation to the modern system, which implements isolation for
punishment and control over prisoners. In Part II this paper will
explore who lives in the SHU, how they get sent there, and how they
can get out. Part III will examine the SHU from the perspective of
11. Fagan, supra note 1.
12. Gearing Up for Round 2 of Hunger Strike, CDCR Threatens Strikers, PRISONER
HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY BLOG (Sept. 23, 2011, 10:59 AM), http://prisoner
hungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/2011/09/23/gearing-up-for-round-2-of-hunger-
strike-cdcr-threatens-strikers.
13. Prisoner Strike Grows to nearly 12,000, PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY BLOG
(Oct. 1, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://prisonerhungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/
2011/10/01/prisoner-hunger-strike-grows-to-nearly-12000/.
14. Three Prisoners Die in Hunger Strike Related Incidents: CDCR Withholds Information
from Family Members, Fails to Report Deaths, PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY BLOG
(Nov. 17, 2011, 5:02 PM), http://prisonerhungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com
/2011/11/17/ three-prisoners-die-in-hunger-strike-related-incidents-cdcr-withholds-
information-from-family-members-fails-to-report-deaths/.
15. Keramet Reiter, Parole, Snitch or Die: California's Supermax Prisons & Prisoners,
1997-2007, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 530, 534 (2012).
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the prisoners, with focus on prison discipline and the long-term
effects of isolation on prisoners. Part IV will evaluate SHUs based
on publicly stated goals. In Part V this paper will propose reforms to
maintain the security of the SHU while improving the quality of life
for inmates by using the hunger strikers' demands as a starting
point. Part VI will survey the prospects for change through each of
the three branches of government, finding that the courts are
especially well-suited to bring about necessary change. This paper
will find that many SHU policies are more restrictive than necessary
to attain the stated goal of increased security. Reforms can be made
without compromising this goal through changes such as permitting
limited educational programming, defining more specific criteria for
sending inmates to the SHU, and amending the debriefing process to
allow inmates to more easily renounce their gang affiliation to leave
the SHU. Finally, the Epilogue will discuss SHU policy changes the
California Department of Corrections proposed in response to the
hunger strikes.
I. The History of Isolation
Although the Pelican Bay SHU was not opened until 1989,16
solitary confinement is not a modem invention. The practice
appears throughout the history of the modern prison, but its form
has evolved. Understanding this history is important to developing
a strategy to address the challenges that face today's prison system.
A. The History of Isolation
Solitary confinement has been part of criminal justice since
before the advent of the modem prison in the early nineteenth
century, and has had a consistent presence in the penal system since
then.17 Americans built the first modem prisons at the close of the
eighteenth century as an embodiment of their rejection of
monarchical corporal punishment.18 These revolutionaries felt their
new republican form of government necessitated a new form of
16. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 22.
17. Id. at 12.
18. David Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISONS 114 (Norval Morris and David Rothman, 1995).
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punishment.19 At this point in time Revolutionary thought extended
no further than the form of punishment; the goal was still
deterrence. 20 The most similar existing European institutions were
workhouses that originated in England in the sixteenth century.21
However, these institutions were meant to remove beggars and
vagrants from society by forcing them to work to derive some sort of
social contribution from them.22 On the other hand, the American
model imposed punishment for criminals. 23
After experimenting with prisons for a few decades, Americans
were not pleased with what they saw.24 Prison riots and escapes
were common but crime rates did not drop. 25 Indeed, prison life
was so unregulated that inmates would even congregate in
communal rooms to plot their escapes together. 26 At the same time
Jacksonian Americans felt that the institutions that upheld social
values, such as the family and church, were losing influence, thus
giving way to more crime. 27 Americans felt that prisons could play a
role in filling this void and imparting desired social values on
individuals. 28 These notions would form the basis of the first
attempts at rehabilitation through incarceration and were first
implemented in New York and Pennsylvania prisons in the 1820s. 2 9
Each state had its own variations on how to accomplish the
reform of inmates but they were unified on the notion that reform
would come through isolation, obedience, and labor.30  In
Pennsylvania, prisoners were isolated at all times, even for meals
and work, although they were allowed occasional visits.3 ' In New
19. Rothman, supra note 18, at 114.
20. Id. at 116.
21. Thomas Munck, Forced Labour, Workhouse-Prisons And The Early Modern State: A





24. Rothman, supra note 18, at 115.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 116.
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York, prisoners were allowed to eat and work together, but had to
do so in complete silence; they could not even exchange glances. 32
The idea was that convicts were not "innately depraved," but rather
untrained in obedience; so prison would train them.33 To instill this
discipline prison life emulated military life, with inmates marching
in lockstep from place to place and bells announcing meals.34 A
theory underlying these experiments was that when a criminal was
isolated from other prisoners, he would "contemplate [his] sinful
past" and reform himself.35 By the early-to-mid-nineteenth century
solitary confinement had become the primary means of
imprisonment. 36  Prisoners were typically isolated for eighteen
months. Over time it became apparent that this was too much for
the prisoners to handle, so the time was reduced first to twelve
months, and then to eight months.37 However, as the nineteenth
century drew to a close, it became evident that the new
penitentiaries were not succeeding in reforming criminals, and that
they were tremendously expensive to operate. 38
After the Civil War, as prisons faced overcrowding, it became
apparent that the regime of isolation would no longer be sustainable.
Prisons were not achieving their goal. 39 The New York legislature
acknowledged that although prisons successfully incapacitated
prisoners, they completely failed at rehabilitation. 40 After 1865,
prisons faced severe overcrowding, with cells designed for one being
used for three or even four inmates.41 At the same time prison
punishments were harsh. Wardens justified the harsh treatment of
prisoners because immigrants composed a greater portion of prison
populations.42 These newcomers were considered impervious to
American traditions and hardened by crime, thus necessitating a
32. Rothman, supra note 18, at 117.
33. Id.
34. J.A. Sharpe, JUDICIAL PUNISHMENT IN ENGLAND 69 (1990).
35. Id.
36. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 12.
37. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750-1850 (1978)
38. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 16.
39. Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in THE OXFORD





heavy hand.43 This xenophobia was part of a larger trend affecting
American society in response to a massive influx of immigrants from
Northern and Western Europe, especially Ireland and Germany.44
Interestingly, the thinking that harsh prison conditions are justified
because prisoners and gang culture are worse than ever is pervasive
today, and is used to justify modern SHUs. 4 5
Between the Civil War and World War II, there were a number
of attempts to reform prisons to address the problems of ill-trained
staff, inadequate cell size, lack of centralized supervision of prisons,
and wardens that found employment because of political patronage
rather than merit.46 For the most part these attempts at reform failed
because reformers had insufficient control over what types of
prisoners would end up at each facility (e.g., they could not have a
facility for only young, first-time offenders).47 Reform was also
difficult due to poorly trained guards and uncooperative wardens. 48
Additionally, so-called "big houses" marked a shift to larger prisons
capable of holding thousands of inmates. During this period solitary
confinement was used as a form of punishment within the prison.49
Prisons would feature a room known as "the hole," a lightless,
unventilated cell where a prisoner could be housed for days as
punishment for misbehavior.50
Also during this period, in 1934, the United States Penitentiary
at Alcatraz Island was opened to house prisoners for whom there
was no hope of rehabilitation.5 1 During the early days of Alcatraz's
operation inmates were not allowed to communicate with one
another. To compensate for the isolation, Alcatraz offered inmates a
good library and above-average food, pleasures not available to
43. Rotman, supra note 39, at 170.
44. United States Immigration Before 1965, (History Channel), http://www.history.
com/ topics/ united-states-immigration-to-1965 (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
45. Transcript: CDCR Undersecretary of Operations Scott Kernan Solitary Confinement in
California Prisons, WHAT THE FOLLY, (Nov. 22, 2012, 12:13 PM) http://www.whatthefolly.
com/2011/09/12/ transcript-cdcr-undersecretary-of-operations-scott-kernan-solitary-
confinement-in-california-prisons/.
46. Rotman, supra note 39, at 184-87.
47. Id. at 182.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 184.
51. Id. at 187.
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SHU prisoners.52 Alcatraz was a carceral institution constructed
specifically for those whom society had given up on, and in many
ways was a precursor to modem SHUs.53 As in a SHU, inmates
were stripped of privileges and barred from contact with the outside
world.54  More strikingly, Alcatraz denoted a comeback for
administrative isolation, either for security purposes or as a form of
punishment for these "worst of the worst" convicts. Administrative
isolation differs from punitive isolation (e.g., "the hole") in that it
was used to control prisoners rather than to punish them for acts
committed in prison.
After World War II "big houses" were replaced with treatment-
oriented correctional institutions.55 This was in reaction to the post-
war international optimism about humanity's future and low crime
rates in the U.S. which combined to give way to a new-found hope
in prisoner rehabilitation.5 6  New facilities, like the Soledad
Correctional Training Facility in California, featured granite walls
instead of fences with guard towers, day rooms with windows to the
outside world, spacious libraries and gyms, as well as acceptable
food, relaxed disciplinary policies, and a spectrum of vocational and
counseling programs.57 Unfortunately, this most recent attempt at
rehabilitation was plagued by the same problems as past endeavors.
Real attempts at rehabilitation were only peripheral, and abuse of
power by wardens and guards went unchecked. 58
Prisoner isolation has had a recurring presence in criminal
justice, predating the first prisons and becoming a central
component of early American prisons. Even after prisons grew too
crowded for every prisoner to be kept in isolation, solitary
confinement was preserved through disciplinary practices involving
"the hole." On Alcatraz Island solitary confinement appeared in its
modern form as a punishment, not to encourage rehabilitation,
because these prisoners were deemed to be beyond the hope of
rehabilitation. Instead, administrative segregation existed as a
52. Rotman, supra note 39, at 188.
53. Id. at 187.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 189.
56. Id.
57. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 20.
58. Id. at 191.
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security measure and form of punishment for the "worst of the
worst."
B. The Rise of the Secure Housing Unit
In 1978, Marion State Penitentiary was classified as the Federal
Bureau of Prisons' highest security prison.59 On October 22, 1983,
two Marion guards were stabbed to death by prisoners. 60 One of the
assailants, Thomas Silverstein, was a leader of the Aryan
Brotherhood prison gang.61 In response to those murders the prison
went into perpetual lockdown, with prisoners being kept in their
cells for twenty-three hours a day. 62 This led to a formalized
procedure where inmates could only get out of solitary after twenty-
four months of good behavior. Another year of good behavior
would get an inmate to the "pre-release unit" which led to the
general population.63 Rehabilitation was no longer the official
purpose of isolation, control was.6" Several state wardens visited
Marion after the imposition of perpetual lockdown, which was
followed by the isolation regime being implemented in many
states.65 This is widely considered the beginning of the modem
isolation movement. 66
Pelican Bay State Prison, opened in 1989, featured California's
first secure housing unit.67 The prison included 1,056 SHU beds and
was built with minimal supervision from the legislature or the courts
despite the introduction of the new isolation regime.68 Prison
administrators who pioneered the facility toured the Florence,
59. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 20.
60. Robert L. Hoffman, BUREAU OF PRISONS (Jan. 25, 2012 10:19 PM), http://
www.bop.gov/about/history/docs/fallen-herohoffman.pdf.
61. America's Most Dangerous Prisoner?, BBC NEWS, Aug. 10, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1393970.stm.
62. J. Michael Olivero & James B. Roberts, Marion Federal Penitentiary and the 22-
Month Lockdown: The Crisis Continues, 27-28 CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 234, 240 (1987).
63. David Ward & Thomas Werlich, Alcatraz and Marion: Evaluating Super-Maximum
Custody, PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY, Jan. 2003, at 53,58.
64. Id.
65. David Ward, Control Strategies for Problem Prisoners in American Penal Systems, in
PROBLEMS OF LONG-TERM IMPRISONMENT 74,86 (1987).
66. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 21; CHASE RIVELAND, SUPERMAX PRISONS: OVERVIEW
AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 4 (Dep't of Justice Jan. 1999).
67. Reiter, supra note 6.
68. Id.
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Arizona Secure Management Unit and decided to replicate the
institution near Crescent City, California. 69 The legislature was not
notified about the radical new isolation scheme being introduced
into California's prison system and the courts were not made aware
of the facility until they began to receive letters and complaints from
Pelican Bay prisoners. 70 Thus, the isolation regime was injected into
the California penal system with minimal external oversight.
The policies of isolation have been fine tuned since then, and
have been widely adopted. In California, the goals of prisoner
isolation have remained largely unchanged. In August 2011,
Undersecretary of Operations for CDCR Scott Kernan addressed the
Assembly and said, "The SHU was created in response to [sic]
serious security threat of gangs in our system. We had to protect
inmates, the staff, and the public [sic] the tangible threats that gangs
present today in our prisons."71 From this statement several goals
can be derived: first, reducing the overall levels of prison violence;
second, reducing prison gang activity through isolating gang
members and leaders; third, increasing staff safety; and finally,
protecting the general public.
II. Who Lives in the SHU?
A. Prison Rule Violators, Alleged Prison Gang Members, and
Parole Violators
Three categories of inmates are placed in the SHU: prison rule
violators, alleged prison gang members and affiliates, and parole
violators.72
Arguably the only group whose placement in the SHU can be
justified is prisoners who commit serious violations of prison rules. 73
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Transcript: CDCR Undersecretary of Operations Scott Kernan Solitary Confinement in
California Prisons, supra note 45.
72. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 71-76.
73. It makes sense to separate serious rule violators, as opposed to alleged gang
members and parole violators, because this is the only category that is based on inmate
behavior.
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However, the application of this policy is less than logical.
Qualifying offenses include tattooing, possession of over five dollars
without authorization, gambling, throwing anything on a
nonprisoner, and theft.74 When an inmate is sent to the SHU for
committing a qualifying offense, they receive a determinate
sentence. 75 This means that, barring another violation, inmates will
know how long they will be in the SHU before being released to a
general-population setting. 76 The amount of time they will spend in
the SHU is calculated based on the SHU term assessment chart.77
The typical expected term for murder of an inmate is forty-eight
months, nine months for distributing controlled substances, three
months for threatening an inmate and six months for bribing a non-
inmate.78 The list of qualifying offenses reveals how broadly CDCR
defines a "serious violation." This vagueness leaves prison
administrators with significant discretion over prisoner discipline
and sending inmates to the SHU. However, at least in theory, it
makes sense to segregate the most disruptive and dangerous
inmates from the rest.
The largest group of SHU inmates, comprising two out of every
three SHU prisoners at Pelican Bay, is alleged gang members. 79 The
trend of significant administrative discretion noted in regards to
prison rule violators also applies to alleged gang members. Title 15,
Subsection 3000 of the California Code of Regulations ("the Code")
defines a prison gang as "any gang which originated and has its
roots within the department or any other prison system."80 The
Code defines a gang as "any ongoing formal or informal
organization, association or group of three or more persons which
has a common name or identifying sign or symbol whose members
and/or associates" engage "on behalf of that organization,
association or group, in two or more acts which include, planning,
organizing, threatening, financing, soliciting, or committing
74. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3341.5(c)(9) (2013).
75. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 71.
76. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3341.5(c)(9).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 74.
80. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3000 (2013).
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unlawful acts or acts of misconduct." 81 The Code provides an
expansive list of criteria that can be used as evidence that an inmate
is a gang member, including tattoos, photographs, enemy lists, staff
information, and visits from documented gang runners.82 The
definition of a "gang" is sufficiently broad that anyone who plans
with anyone else on breaking a prison rule can be deemed a gang
member.
The most significant difference between prison rule violators
and alleged gang members is that alleged gang members receive an
indeterminate SH-U sentence. 83  This means that alleged gang
members remain in the SHU until the end of their prison sentence,
they participate in the debriefing process (which involves divulging
detailed information about the gang and who its members are), or
they die.84 This policy is even more troubling when examined in the
context of CDCR's purported goals. The SHU exists to increase
safety,85 but an inmate will be sent to the SHU for only forty-eight
months if they commit murder, compared to an indefinite sentence
for an alleged gang member who may not have actually participated
in or contributed to any prison violence.
The final category of SHU inmates is parole violators. CDCR
has a policy that any former SHU inmate who violates his parole or
is imprisoned for a new offense is automatically sent to the SHU,
regardless of the nature of the original offense or the violation. 86
Members of this group face the same problems discussed above
because they begin either as prison rule violators or alleged gang
members.
B. Release from the SHU
SHU inmates have a common saying about how to get out of the
SHU: "snitch, parole, or die." Snitching is not a viable option for
most inmates because it requires turning against other inmates, who
often, after years or even decades of incarceration, have become the
81. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3000.
82. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3378 (2013).
83. Reiter, supra note 15, at 542.
84. Id. at 7.
85. Transcript: CDCR Undersecretary of Operations Scott Kernan Solitary Confinement in
California Prisons, supra note 45.
86. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 76.
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SHU inmate's de facto family. If an inmate's prison sentence ends,
even if he has an indeterminate SHU sentence, he will be paroled.87
And, of course, if an inmate dies while in the SHU, there is nothing
more that prison authorities can do to prolong his suffering and
isolation. This option is a very real possibility for inmates with long
prison sentences and indefinite SI-U terms. Compared with death
and snitching, parole is the only acceptable path out of the SHU. In
addition to these three options, less than one-third of prisoners who
are in the SHU for prison rule violations have been sentenced to a
determinate term, so at the end of that term they will automatically
be released into the general population.88
The most controversial way to get out of the SHU is "snitching,"
formally known as debriefing.89 Debriefing involves alleged gang
members revealing their own gang-related activities and the names
of other gang members. 90 This process poses several significant
issues. First, the process assumes the alleged gang member is in fact
an actual gang member. Thus, when prison authorities incorrectly
categorize an inmate as a gang member, that individual is placed in
a situation that is not anticipated in the debriefing process. The
alleged gang members are required to reveal the prisoner's gang
related activities or the names of other gang members. This is
impossible for incorrectly alleged gang members because they
simply do not have information to divulge. Second, even when an
inmate truly is a prison gang member, revealing gang secrets and
identifying members is not a simple task. From the inmates'
perspective, their gang likely functioned as their family and friends,
people they have known for a long time. 91 Asking an inmate to
betray his adopted family is unthinkable for many. Third, if a SHU
prisoner makes the difficult decision to debrief, he will return to a
general population prison where he will live in constant danger
from retaliation from his former gang.92 In fact, State Senator Gloria
Romero has acknowledged that "[i]n the world of prison rules, to
name names -essentially to snitch-is basically marking someone
87. Reiter, supra note 15, at 552.
88. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 74.
89. Id. at 83.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 84.
92. Id. at 86.
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for death. You don't do that."93
In summary, the debriefing process leaves SHU prisoners no
good options. If they lack gang-related information to divulge they
have no way out. Even if they have the information, revealing it
requires betraying those closest to the inmate, which places the
inmate's life in danger.
This broken system prevents SHU prisoners from being
released, forcing some to stay in isolation for as long as seventeen
years in California. 94 While CDCR does not keep records of how
long inmates stay in isolation, one study found that the average SHU
stay ranged from six to twenty-nine months. 95 However, this data
reflects only the stays of inmates who were eligible for parole. The
true average, accounting for inmates with very long sentences
(including life without the possibility of parole), is likely much
longer.
III. The Prisoners' Experience
A. Life in the Secure Housing Unit
Life in the SHU revolves around the simple notion that SHU
prisoners are the "worst of the worst," and therefore deserve no
privileges (other than the minimum standards required by law).
Among these denied privileges is human contact. 96 SHU inmates are
kept isolated in their cells for 22.5 hours a day. 97 They are only let
out to exercise for one hour, four times a week, and for three fifteen-
minute showers each week.98 They eat in their cells, and even
exercise in isolation.99 Thus they are treated more like caged,
uncontrollable animals than human beings.
The total isolation forced upon SHU prisoners is only possible
with the use of the latest technology.100 Cells are arranged in
93. Carrie Kahn, Hunger Strikes Puts Focus on Calif. Prison Conditions, NAT'L PUBLIC
RADIO, (July 21, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/21/138522172/hunger-strike-
puts-focus-on-calif-prison-conditions.
94. Reiter, supra note 15, at 553.
95. Id.
96. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 153.
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id. at 153.
99. Id. at 143.
100. Id. at 105-28.
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"pods," units of eight cells. 101 Each pod has a control room where
cell doors can be opened, and the guard can see a display of video
monitors showing every cell.102 The number eight was chosen
because it was calculated that limiting the pods in this manner
would prevent the possibility of ever having to let two inmates out
of their cells at the same time. 103  Moreover, all prison
communication with the prisoners occurs through an intercom
system, in order to limit guard contact with the prisoners. 04 The
individual cells have no windows, so the only view inmates get is of
their concrete surroundings. Even their furniture is made of
concrete.105  Prison administrators have cleverly satisfied legal
requirements for providing inmates with natural light by installing
skylights in the corridors outside the cells, to prevent inmates from
actually seeing the outside world. 106 This is perhaps an upgrade
from the total darkness of the "hole" used in the past, but hardly an
amenity. Additionally, inmates have virtually no privacy because
their cell doors are made of perforated steel, allowing guards to look
into the cells at any given time. 107
One of the more peculiar aspects of life in the SHU is the
feeding ritual. Inmates are given food twice a day.108 In the
morning they are given breakfast and a packed lunch, and in the
evening they are given dinner.109 As part of the isolation regime
prisoners eat alone in their cells." 0 Food is delivered through a slot
in the cell door, and safety precautions are taken to ensure that
prisoners are sitting on their beds during delivery."1 Meal delivery
is the most interaction inmates have with guards on a daily basis,
and exemplifies the extreme measures taken in the name of safety.112
The only time that SHU prisoners are regularly allowed out of
101. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 112.
102. Id. at 113.
103. Id. at 114.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 120.
106. Id. at 117-19.
107. Id. at 121.
108. Id. at 143.
109. Id. at 143.
110. Id. at 144.
111. Id. at 146.
112. Id. at 143.
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their cells for a meaningful amount of time is for solitary exercise
four times a week.113 However, it should be understood that even
this is not a privilege. The exercise yard is no more than a twenty-six
foot by ten foot concrete cage.114 It has a mesh cover over the top,
which is partially covered by Plexiglas."15 It has twenty-foot-high
walls and no exercise equipment.116 Essentially there is nothing an
inmate can do in the exercise yard that they cannot do in their own
cells other than run around in circles.117 That is why among inmates
the yard is known as the "dog run."118 Needless to say, exercise time
does not provide an opportunity for inmates to experience nature or
benefit from human contact.
The isolation regime is applied even to family visits and medical
appointments.119 Families may only meet with SHU prisoners twice
a month, for two hours each time.120 According to CDCR's Visiting
Information Hotline, SHU visits occur through glass, so inmates can
never touch their families while incarcerated, while general
population prisoners at Pelican Bay are allowed contact visits.121 In
addition to the physical barrier between inmates and their families,
Pelican Bay's remote location serves an additional obstacle for
families to visit SHU prisoners. Most Pelican Bay SHU inmates
come from the Los Angeles area, which is a fourteen-hour drive
from the prison.122 This combination of factors creates a situation
where there are only about fifty visits each weekend day for 1,000
SHU prisoners.123  Similarly, many medical appointments are
conducted through telemedicine, a practice which involves a doctor
speaking to an inmate through a video set rather than in person.124
When being transported from the SHU for these visits prisoners'
113. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 143.
114. Id. at 123.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 124.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 154-59.
120. Id. at 156.
121. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, Visiting Information,
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Ombuds/visiting.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
122. Id. at 157.
123. Id. at 156.
124. Id. at 125.
342 [Vol. 10
MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN NECESSARY
hands, legs, and bodies are chained as a security measure.125
Moreover, when inmates do visit the infirmary they are subjected to
a strip search before and after the visit.126 These precautions are
taken with all SHU inmates, including those who have never
committed a violent rule violation while in prison. While such
measures may be appropriate for some inmates, the broad
application is unnecessarily demeaning and intrusive.
Throughout this system of isolation there are a few windows to
the outside world. In California inmates are allowed to have a
television set in their cells; however, not all states allow even this
meager concession.127 They can also receive and keep an unlimited
number of personal letters.128 Additionally, inmates are allowed to
receive a single package each year from their families, although the
contents of the package are strictly regulated by prison
administration.12 9 Finally, SHU prisoners are allowed to keep a
maximum of five pieces of reading material in their cells at any
given time.130
Due to their total isolation there is little opportunity for SHU
inmates to act out. However, inmates have found a few ways to act
out, one of the more common of which is known as "gassing." 3 1
Gassing is when inmates take their fecal matter and urine, which are
among the few things they have control over, and throw it at staff
through their cell doors.132
In a general-population prison more serious offenses could
result in a trip to the SHU; however, this is not an option for
prisoners who are already there. In the SHU, guards often respond
by spraying tear gas and other chemical agents into the cell of the
offending inmate. Other times inmates are "hog-tied"133 and
125. Id. at 105.
126. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, supra note 121, at 154.
127. Id. at 150.
128. Id. at 152.
129. Id. at 149.
130. Id. at 150.
131. Id. at 165.
132. Id.
133. Being "hog-tied" entails handcuffing an inmate's hands in front of his body,
but his feet in leg irons, and then drawing a chain between the restraints and tightening
it so the hands and ankles are only a few inches apart. Id.
Summer 2013] 343
beaten. 134  There is no doubt that this egregious behavior is
unjustifiable and disproportionate as it has been condemned as
"excessive" by a California federal district court.135 As harsh as this
response is for the receiving inmate, it is worse for those in
neighboring cells. As cell doors are made of perforated steel and
cells have no windows or other ventilation, neighboring prisoners
are exposed to the fumes and chemical agents that are used in
response to the actions of their neighbors. 136 Punishing a single
inmate results in collective punishment.
B. Factories of Mental Illness
In the context of coercive interrogation, international experts
have declared that solitary confinement is torture. 137 Although SHU
inmates are not subject to coercive interrogation, even a cursory
examination of the effects of isolation on them reveals why
international experts have equated isolation with torture.
Craig Haney, of the University of California, Santa Cruz,
conducted a survey of Pelican Bay SHU prisoners to determine their
mental health.138 His findings were shocking. 91% of SHU inmates
suffer from anxiety or nervousness; more than 80% suffer from
headaches, lethargy, and trouble sleeping; 70% fear impending
mental breakdown; 77% are chronically depressed; and 41% have
hallucinations. 139 Supporting these conclusions, David Lovell, in his
study of administrative segregation facilities in Washington State,
found that 45% of SHU inmates show "credible evidence of serious
mental health issues."140 Moreover, even though California has only
3,000 SHU prisoners141 out of a total prison population of 170,000,
69% of suicides in California's justice system occurred in secure
134. Shalev, supra note 7, at 165.
135. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
136. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 166.
137. Hernan Reyes, The Worst Scars are in the Mind: Psychological Torture, 89 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 591, 608 (2007).
138. Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-term Solitary and "Supermax"
Confinement, CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1, 1 (2003).
139. Id. at 18.
140. David Lovell, Patterns of Disturbed Behavior in a Supermax Population, CRIMINAL
JUST. AND BEHAV. 985, 999 (2008).
141. Transcript: CDCR Undersecretary of Operations Scott Kernan Solitary Confinement
in California Prisons, supra note 45.
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housing units in 2005.142 To put this in perspective, SHU prisoners
comprise only 1.8% of the total prison population.143 However, they
commit suicide at a chilling rate approximately 124 times higher
than general population prisoners.144 It is likely that the isolation of
the SHU drives inmates to the brink, leading to self-destructive
behavior and suicide.
Some may argue the results of these studies are open to
interpretation because it is unclear whether isolation caused the
mental health issues, whether mental health issues caused the
behavior that resulted in being sent to the SHU, or whether the
mental health issues are unrelated to the reasons for being sent to the
SHU. It is unlikely that prisoners with mental health issues are more
likely to be sent to the SHU since SHU assignment is generally
linked to gang affiliation rather than specific actions that might be
linked to existing mental illness. Instead, the unnatural isolation of
the SHU environment is a factory of mental illness.
The secure housing unit is a unique place. Prisons are designed
to separate those who commit crimes from the rest of society. The
SHU is designed to separate its inmates not only from the rest of
society, but also from the general prison population, and indeed
even other SHU inmates. These layers of isolation produce an
unnatural environment where the only outlet a prisoner has to the
outside world is a television. Outside of these images on a screen
and the words in a book, prisoners are left to the prison of their own
minds. There is no regular conversation with another person, and
no physical contact with loved ones for years. This total isolation
drives men to the brink of insanity, and pushes them to take their
own lives at an alarming rate.
C. SHU Classification Review
Being moved from a general population prison to the SHU is a
major event in the life of a prisoner, and those who make these
decisions about a prisoner's fate wield tremendous power. Being
142. Kevin Johnson, Inmate Suicides Linked to Solitary, USA TODAY (Dec. 27 2006),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-12-27-inmate-suicides-x.htm.
143. 3,000 SHU inmates / 170,000 total inmates = -1.8%
144. 69% of suicides out of 3,000 SHU inmates means 2.3% of SHU inmates commit
suicide. 31% of suicides out of 167,000 non-SHU inmates means .0185% of non-SHU
inmates commit suicide. 2.3% / .0185% = -124
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labeled as a SHU inmate immediately means one is no longer
eligible for education or vocational training, or recreational
programming. 145  In California, the Institutional Classification
Committee ("ICC") makes these decisions. ICC is comprised of
three members and is chaired by the warden or chief deputy warden
of the institution.146 This is startling because although wardens are
the highest ranking officials at a prison, one would expect a body
that wields so much power to be comprised of state-level officials to
provide consistency across prisons, or at least have state-level
supervision. However, this feature is not unique to California. In a
study of thirty-four states with administrative segregation units, not
a single state had a mechanism for external review of classification
decisions.147
In California, the only reviews of ICC decisions are made by the
Departmental Review Board ("DRB").148 However, the DRB only
reviews cases that are referred to it by the ICC, which is the same
body that makes the decisions in question.149 Therefore there is a
conflict of interest inherent in this system of appeals, because the
only decisions that will ever be referred to the DRB are decisions
made by the ICC which the ICC itself thinks merit further review. 150
Moreover, the ICC's main factor in making classification decisions is
institutional security, which is primarily based on staff reports.151
Thus, even though there is technically a mechanism for inmates
wrongly assigned to the SHU to question their classification, the
procedure is stacked against them. First, the primary decision is
based on staff reports, where staff members have no incentive to
move a prisoner back to the general population. Second, they must
attempt to convince the ICC that its initial decision was wrong, in
order to even have a chance at a DRB hearing.
145. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 79.
146. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, Entering a California
State Prison-What to Expect, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Ombuds/Entering_a_Prison
FAQs.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
147. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, Supernax Housing: A Survey of Current Practice 3 (1997),
available at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/013722.pdf.
148. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a) (2013).
149. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 91.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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IV. Evaluating the SHU
It is important to have an effective process to evaluate SHUs,
especially given the rapid increase in administrative segregation
populations.152 To evaluate whether SHUs are successful, one must
compare the goals against reality. CDCR's stated goals in operating
SHU facilities are reducing the overall levels of prison violence,
reducing prison gang activity, increasing staff safety, and protecting
the general public. 153 Essentially, the purpose of secure housing
units is to identify the most dangerous and disruptive prisoners and
isolate them in a super-maximum security environment to neutralize
their effect on the rest of the prison population. 54 This section shall
examine each goal in turn.
A. Reducing Overall Prison Violence
CDCR's philosophy underlying SHUs is that removing the most
violent individuals from a group will produce a less violent group.
However, the reality of prison violence does not reinforce this
idea.155 According to Madrid v. Gomez, "[CDC] presented the Pelican
Bay SHU as a centerpiece of their program to decrease violence in
the California prison system. However, evidence regarding the
SHU's significance is inconclusive." 5 6
For the first two years after the Pelican Bay SHU opened, the
rate of California prison violence dropped. 157 Since then it has been
steadily rising.158 Additionally, a study of Arizona, Illinois, and
Minnesota found that the introduction of administrative segregation
units did not reduce inmate-on-inmate violence system-wide.159
Absent a showing that some certain event(s) have caused this
152. John Gibbons & Nicholas Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.
L. & POL'Y 385, 405 (2006).
153. Transcript: CDCR Undersecretary of Operations Scott Kernan Solitary Confinement
in California Prisons, supra note 45.
154. Id.
155. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146, 1263 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
156. Id. at 1263.
157. These claims have been adjusted for overall prison population growth.
158. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 209.
159. Chad Briggs et al., The Effect of Supermaximum Secuirty Prisons on Aggregate
Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1367 (2003).
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increase in violence, CDCR cannot claim that administrative
segregation has succeeded in making prisons safer.
One indicator of the level of prison safety is the prevalence of
prison programming. This is because outbreaks of violence push
prison administrators to put the prison on lockdown and prohibit
volunteers from entering. Thus if prisons are getting safer,
volunteer-run prison programming should be on the rise. However,
"[t]here is little evidence, then, at least in California, that the
introduction of [secure housing units] has had a positive impact on
the availability of programs in general population prisons." 160
Interestingly, another form of violence not part of the SHU
goals, guard-on-prisoner violence, has increased in the S-U era. 161
This indicates that isolating the "worst of the worst" from the
general population has not improved the security environment
sufficiently to reduce the number of times prison guards feel it is
necessary to act with force. This phenomenon is not fully
understood, and it should be noted that it may be possible that the
introduction of administrative segregation to prisons has actually
increased the frequency of guard-on-prisoner violence.
Another factor in the discussion on reducing prison violence is
deterrence. It is possible that CDCR discretely operates the SHUs
under a theory that having such a severe punishment for gang
membership or other forbidden activities will deter inmates from
engaging in them. However, one-third to three-fourths of all
inmates sent to California SHUs in any given year end up serving
multiple SHU terms. 162 This indicates that, even among individuals
who have endured the bleak conditions of the SHU, the isolation
regime is not effective in deterring them from engaging in gang
membership and serious rule violations.
B. Reducing Prison Gang Activity
The goal of reducing prison gang activity is largely measured by
violence. Therefore the analysis about overall prison violence is
equally applicable to this section. Furthermore, it is possible that, by
identifying and segregating prison gang leaders, authorities created
160. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 214.
161. Id. at 211.
162. Reiter, supra note 15, at 554.
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a power vacuum 1 63 in which new leaders arose and fractionalized
existing prison gangs.16" A similar phenomenon occurred in Mexico
when authorities removed the leaders of the Guadalajara Cartel from
power, resulting in the Cartel's splitting into the many warring
factions plaguing Mexico today.165 While there is no definitive
evidence as to whether prison gang activity is rising or falling, there
are no clear indicators that SHUs have been effective at neutralizing
prison gangs.
C. Increasing Staff Safety
There is consensus among staff in administrative segregation
units that they feel safe.16 6 Such a feeling is not surprising given the
incredible lengths taken to create a safe environment in SHUs. It is
nearly impossible for a SHU inmate to attack a guard outside of
gassing, which is undoubtedly disgusting but not life-threatening. 167
However, this feeling of security has not extended beyond the
bounds of the SHU. Statistics show SHUs have not had a
measurable effect in decreasing inmate-on-staff violence in general
population prisons,168 which is a better indicator of whether SHUs
have increased staff safety overall. As SHUs only hold 1.8% of
California's prisoners,169 the feeling of safety of the guards for this
tiny minority of prisoners should not justify the human and
monetary costs of maintaining these facilities.
D. Protecting the General Public
Whether the introduction of administrative segregation has
increased public safety is difficult to measure. Indeed it is not clear
what measure should be used to determine success because public
safety is such a vague concept and there is no single way in which
SHUs impact public safety. Nonetheless, one measure that may give
163. Geoffrey Hunt et al., Changes in Prison Culture: Prison Gangs and the Case of the
"Pepsi Generation," 40 Soc. PROBS. 398, 403 (1993).
164. CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF
CRISIS 209 (1999).
165. Will Grant, Mexico Drugs: How One DEA Killing Began a Brutal War, BBC NEWS,
Feb. 7,2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16920870.
166. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 214.
167. Id. at 165.
168. Id. at 210.
169. 3,000 SHU inmates / 170,000 total inmates = -1.8%.
Summer 2013] MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN NECESSARY 349
at least some insight is the recidivism rates of SHU inmates.
However, only two recent articles have focused on the release of
SHU inmates back into the community.170 One of these studies
looked to Florida SHU inmates, and found that they were no more
likely than their non-SHU counterparts to be violent recidivists.171
The other article examined SHU inmates in Washington State, and
found that SITU inmates released directly from the SHU into the
community had the highest felony recidivism rates of any group
studied. 172 Neither of these studies indicates that SHUs reduce
recidivism rates. Indeed, the Washington study suggests that SHU
inmates who are not moved to transitional housing prior to release
from prison may pose a greater risk to public safety than any other
group.
Some argue that holding SHU inmates to the same recidivism
rates as non-SHU inmates, per the Florida study, is a success due to
how dangerous SHU inmates are. However, this argument is weak
because there is no evidence that SHU inmates are actually
predisposed to higher rates of recidivism. Beyond this questionable
benefit, there is no clear link between SHUs and increased public
safety.
E. Costs
The most easily measurable costs of SHUs are monetary. On
average, the cost of constructing SHU housing is $14,600 more per
bed than general population prison housing.173 Additionally, SHUs
have higher staffing costs than regular prisons due to the higher
security requirements.17 4  CDCR does not release the costs of
keeping a prisoner broken down by institution, making it impossible
to know exactly how high the costs are.175 However, based on data
from states that do provide such data, SHU prisoners cost on
average twice as much as non-SHU prisoners.176 In California, the
170. Reiter, supra note 15, at 535.
171. Id.
172. Id.at 535-36.
173. Office of the Inspector General, Management of the CDCR Administrative
Segregation Unit Population 3 (2009).
174. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 218.
175. Reiter, supra note 6.
176. Id.
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average prisoner costs the state $49,000 every year.177 SHU inmates
likely cost much more.178 These higher costs are especially relevant
in today's meager budget climate.
Perhaps more pressing than the financial costs are the human
costs. Isolation in the SHU can create serious mental illnesses, which
endangers public safety because many SHU prisoners will
eventually be released to the community with mental illnesses that
they did not have upon entering the justice system. 179 These
prisoners are potentially more disposed to criminality upon release
because serious mental illness will likely decrease employment
opportunities and the ability to keep a job for those who can find
one, increasing the need to commit crime. Thus, in addition to
imposing torture-like conditions on prisoners, SHUs are potentially
threatening public safety in the long run. In light of the monetary
and human costs imposed by SHUs there is a significant need to
revisit SHU policies, and even consider eliminating the institution
entirely.
There is no evidence indicating that secure housing units are
effective at attaining their stated goals of increasing overall prison
safety, or decreasing prison gang activity. While there is some
indication that SHUs are effective at increasing staff safety for staff
working within the SHU, there is no evidence indicating a similar
increase in security for staff at general population prisons.
Additionally, there is no evidence that SHUs increase public safety
by decreasing recidivism rates or in some other way. Therefore
there are certain undeniable benefits to operating secure housing
units, but none of the major goals of SHUs are being accomplished.
Prison violence has not decreased, prison gang activity is not falling,
and neither non-SHU prison staff nor the general public is safer
because of the introduction of SHUs. The financial and human costs
are clear and perturbing. In light of the costs and the lack of benefits
of the SHU, it is difficult to justify its continued existence.
177. Where Does $49,000 for Each Inmate Go?, MOTHER JONES (July/Aug.2008),
http://www.mothejones.com/politics/2008/07/where-does-49000-each-inmate-go.
178. Id.
179. Lovell, supra note 140.
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V. Proposed Reforms
The Pelican Bay hunger strikers' demands should inform any
discussion about SHU reform because the demands reveal a unique
combination of what the prisoners value most and what they think is
politically feasible. The strikers made five demands: abolishing the
debriefing process and modifying the gang status criteria; expanding
programming and privileges for SHU inmates with indefinite terms;
ending long-term solitary confinement; ending group punishment;
and providing adequate food.180
The hunger strikes have already laid the foundation for change.
As a result of the hunger strikes the California Assembly held a
committee hearing on solitary confinement where a variety of
experts criticized SHU policies. 181 Additionally, in response to the
second strike, CDCR released a memo requiring a detailed review of
every SHU inmate who was in the SHU due to gang validation. 182
This legislative interest and gesture of goodwill from CDCR indicate
that change is possible, and that momentum is building.
A. Shutting Down the SHU
In light of the relatively minor successes of the SHU and the
high costs, policy makers should consider eliminating the system of
widespread, long-term administrative segregation. Only through
such drastic action can the monetary costs of the SHU be recovered
because the very nature of the SHU necessitates higher construction
and operating costs. It does not appear that simply changing certain
aspects of how the facilities are run could cut the costs down to
general population prison levels because most of the costs are
associated with the construction of and staffing requirements
inherent to SHUs. Additionally, closing down the SHUs would
eliminate the human costs, including creating mental illness and
maintaining a torture-like environment.
180. Demands, supra note 8.
181. Sal Rodriguez, Historic California Assembly Hearing on Solitary Confinement,
SOLITARY WATCH BLOG (Aug. 24, 2011), http://solitarywatch.com/2011/08/24/historic-
california-assembly-hearing-on-solitary-confinement.
182. Hunger Strikers at Pelican Bay End Strike After Nearly 3 Weeks: Strike Continues at




However, shutting down the SHfU is unlikely due to a
combination of factors, including political feasibility and possible
pushback from the prison guards' union based on fear for officer
safety. Moreover, eliminating the SHU entirely may not be the best
policy decision because it would take away a powerful tool for
prison administrators to control the most dangerous and disruptive
inmates. Still, if the SHU is to be retained, the procedure and
requirements for being sent to the SHU need to be drastically
reformed. Also, although total elimination of the SHU is not
immediately likely, it is important to retain it as a long-term goal,
because only through shutting down the SHU can the prisoners be
held in acceptable conditions.
B. More Tangible Criteria for Being Sent to the SHU
There are two main categories of prisoners who are sent to the
SHU: prison rule violators and alleged gang affiliates. There are
problems with how each of these groups is sent to the SHU and
simple reforms can create a more just process.
Prisoners can be sent to the SHU for serious rule violations, but
the process allows prison administrators excessive discretion.
Qualifying offenses are as minor as tattooing, possession of over five
dollars, and gambling.183 The general idea of punishing prisoners
who consistently violate prison rules, or who pose a threat of danger
to other prisoners or staff, is sound and must be maintained.
However, it is difficult to argue that a game of cards poses a
significant security risk punishable by a trip to the SHU. In order to
reduce administrators' discretion, states should not only remove
such trivial offenses but institutionalize state-level oversight
regarding decisions to send prisoners to the SHU. This will grant
the process credibility, and will give prison administrators an
incentive to send inmates to the SHIU only when truly necessary.
The other category of SHU inmates, alleged prison gang
members, should not be sent to the SHU on that ground alone. The
California regulations covering this process are even more open-
ended than those for prison rule violations18 4 As previously
mentioned, a prison gang member is defined as anyone with at least
183. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3315 (2013).
184. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3000.
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two friends who knowingly violates a prison rule. 185 Although
prison systems have a clear duty to discourage gang activity, there
are more legitimate ways of doing so. Prison gang members can still
be targeted for a SHU sentence, but only if there is also a behavioral
component to the sentence, such as a serious rule violation.
Retaining only this policy would eliminate the problem of non-gang
members being sent to the SHU under the pretense of gang
membership and being unable to leave because they lack
information to divulge during the debriefing process. Also,
adopting this policy would acknowledge that prison administrators
have less-than-perfect information about prison gangs, which can
result in innocent people being sent to the SHU under allegations of
gang membership. The policy change would further recognize that
justice requires prison administrators not to punish individuals who
do not actually pose a risk to the system.
C. Reforming the Debriefing Process
Most inmates are sent to the SHU for alleged gang membership,
and lack appropriate procedures to redeem themselves and return to
general population prisons. 186 They must go through the debriefing
process, which involves renouncing gang membership and
divulging gang secrets, an act that requires betraying the only
friends some inmates have for years or even decades.187 This process
is unduly intrusive and likely accounts for the fact that so few SHU
inmates go through it, despite the inhumane living conditions of the
SHU. Moreover, it conflicts with CDCR's goals of promoting
security because a prisoner could be targeted and even murdered by
his former gang for divulging gang secrets.188 CDCR could
effectively accomplish its goals by modifying the debriefing process
and making it less intrusive by not requiring names of other gang
members. This is why the Pelican Bay hunger strikers have made
this reform one of their main demands.189
Of the goals CDCR has enumerated for the SHU, the debriefing
process would have to fall under the category of reducing prison
185. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3000.
186. SHALEv, supra note 7, at 74.
187. Id. at 84.
188. Kahn, supra note 87.
189. Demands, supra note 8.
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gang activity. Unless CDCR is willing to actively and openly engage
in a regime of collective punishment, it must recognize that a
prisoner only has control over himself and not the rest of his alleged
gang. Therefore it should be sufficient for an inmate to denounce
gang membership and refrain from engaging in gang-related
activities. These are the same procedures currently used with the
requirement of divulging gang member lists and activities removed.
This change would allow all alleged gang members to go through
the debriefing process. It would also allow those who are not
actually part of a prison gang, and therefore currently have no
avenue to leave the SHU, to satisfy the debriefing requirements.
Moreover, because the inmates would not have to divulge gang
secrets, their former gang would be less likely to target them for
retaliation. CDCR has not adequately shown a need for requiring
SHU inmates to reveal gang secrets in order to leave the SHU, and
by eliminating this requirement CDCR could create a more humane
and just SITU environment.
D. Allowing for Privileges that Pose No Added Security Risk
If CDCR is serious in claiming that the SITU exists to preserve
security, and not as a form of punishment,190 SHU policies should be
amended so that any policy that does not substantively contribute to
increased security is replaced with a less restrictive one. This single
policy reform would allow for significant changes to make life in the
SHU more bearable.
Allowing educational programming, more frequent and longer
family visits, and multiple packages each year would not
compromise the security of the SHU. Educational programming
could be delivered through the television sets prisoners are already
allowed to have in their cells, creating no added risk from having to
transport them out of the cell more often. Additionally, there is no
reason to believe allowing family visits longer than two hours would
pose an increased security risk. If an inmate is going to
communicate about an escape attempt or plan an act of violence
during a family visit, limiting the visit to two hours would not grant
any added security. Thus, especially in light of the fact that families
190. Transcript: CDCR Undersecretary of Operations Scott Kernan Solitary Confinement
in California Prisons, supra note 45.
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travel such great distances to see SHU prisoners, visits should be
much longer than two hours, perhaps even a whole day. Not only
would this increase the inmates' human contact, but it would also
serve as an incentive for families to visit the prisoners because a
fourteen-hour drive for a two-hour visit is difficult to justify for a
family struggling to make ends meet. Finally, packages that SHU
inmates receive are so tightly controlled that they do not pose a
significant security risk, so more than one package should be
allowed each year. The importance of this reform is reflected in its
being one of the few demands made by the Pelican Bay hunger-
strikers. If inmates were to use the packages to smuggle contraband
or illegal communications, this activity would occur even with a
single package. However, as the SHU is an incredibly safe place it
does not appear that the annual packages create a major security
threat, so multiple packages each year would not compromise the
SHU's security.
These rule changes would not compromise the super-maximum
security necessary in the SHU, but they would allow inmates regular
human interactions and significantly reduce the human costs of the
SHU. Importantly, these changes would not affect the use of
technology and other policies that are essential for security. Thus,
SHUs could continue to maintain a high guard-to-inmate ratio, use
technology to monitor inmates at all times, and exercise extreme
caution when interacting with and transporting prisoners. While
keeping these policies still poses problems in regard to psychological
problems related to a lack of privacy, adopting the proposed
modifications partially addresses the needs of inmates, and
represents a step in the right direction for SHU reform.
E. Ending Long-Term Solitary Confinement
Another of the hunger-strikers' demands is an end to long-term
solitary confinement.191 While prison administrators argue that
solitary confinement is a necessary component of administrative
segregation units and essential to the added security of such
facilities, it may be possible to maintain a high level of security
without entirely depriving inmates of human interaction. Currently,
administrative isolation functions to incapacitate the "worst of the
191. Demands, supra note 9.
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worst" prisoners by preventing them from interacting with other
prisoners or staff, and also significantly decreasing their ability to
communicate with others.
States could experiment with a pseudo-SHU facility in which
inmates are allowed some regular human interaction, but are still
closely monitored and significant safety precautions are still taken.
For example, Pelican Bay prisoners already live in pods of eight or so
inmates.192 Perhaps California could allow these eight inmates to
exercise with one another, and have communal meals. At the same
time CDCR would not allow them to interact with those outside of
the pod, preventing prison gang leaders from orchestrating acts of
violence. Also, because the population of each pod is so small, and
security would remain high, it would be extremely difficult for an
inmate to attack another inmate without being stopped.
Shutting down the SHU is not the best option for CDCR,
because the SHU can provide some benefit, albeit to a much smaller
class of inmates. Part of the reform must be a shift to more tangible
criteria for being sent to the SHU, as opposed to simply an
individual's status (i.e., alleged gang member). Moreover, the
debriefing process should be modified so that inmates are no longer
required to "snitch" on their former gang, or eliminated entirely.
Also, SHU inmates should be allowed privileges that pose no
additional security risk, such as educational programming and
longer family visits. Finally, SHUs should not facilitate long-term
solitary confinement because such artificial isolation is inhumane
and likely creates mental illness in otherwise healthy individuals.
VI. Avenues for Change
As with most California agencies, CDCR operations involve an
intersection of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
government. The legislature authorizes the executive to operate
CDCR, and defines the overall scope of the department. The
executive administers the legislation, and promulgates regulations to
more precisely define how the department will function. Finally, the
judiciary branch oversees CDCR, and provides an avenue for
discontented individuals to challenge CDCR policies. 193 In order to
192. SHALEV, supra note 7, at 112.
193. See generally CAL. CONST. art. VI.
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enact the necessary change in the operation of SHUs, all three
branches must be proactive in playing their part.
Of the three branches, in some ways the legislature has the most
power over CDCR because it adopts the laws that allow the
department's function and define its scope. However, the legislature
is also the furthest removed from the reality of the SHU. Legislators
have no regular access to actual SHU inmates, they are not prison
reform experts, and by the very nature of their role they do not deal
with individual problems or the day-to-day operations of CDCR.
For this reason, the legislature may not be well suited for the task of
SHU reform.
For example, the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), which
was enacted by Congress in 1996, attempted to fix a system where
the courts were being clogged up by inmate litigation, but ended up
creating serious problems for inmates. 194 In trying to cut down
inmate litigation, Congress inadvertently created a new problem
where inmates with valid complaints have a much more difficult
time getting their cases heard in court, because all complaints first
have to go through internal prison complaint mechanisms.195 While
this requirement may have made sense to the legislators, in reality it
presents prisoners with "often-insurmountable obstacles to
overcome in order to file complaints in federal court," because
prisons have little incentive to side with inmates. 196 It is clear that, in
passing the PLRA, Congress wanted to decrease the backlog in
courts created by inmates, but there is no evidence that virtual
inaccessibility of the courts was their intention. The PLRA
demonstrates the challenges of having the legislature, which is so far
removed from the realities of the prisons, be the principle force in
reform. While legislative action would provide for the most drastic
SHU reform, the nature of the legislature makes the task better
suited to the other branches.
Although CDCR is part of the executive branch, the executive
lacks sufficient power to effectuate SHU reform on its own. The
executive also requires assistance from the legislature before any
194. Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007: Hearing Before the H. Judiciary Comm. on Crime,
Terrorism and Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. 2-6 (2008) (statement of Jeanne Woodford,
former Secretary of Cal. Dept. of Corrections).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 3.
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major reform can be implemented. Moreover, even minor reform
can be problematic without the support of the legislature because the
executive relies on the legislature to fund any changes, as well as to
define the scope of executive departments. For these reasons it is
difficult, if not impossible, for the executive branch to spearhead any
meaningful reform without significant support from the legislature.
However, it is this combination of interest from CDCR and
legislators that may produce some reforms in the wake of the Pelican
Bay hunger strikes.
The sequence of events from the first Pelican Bay hunger strike
to the second exemplify this executive inertia and the power the
Legislature has over CDCR. The first hunger strike took place in
Julyl 97 and ended with promises from CDCR that proved to be just
words.198 Following the strike there was no measureable difference
in the lives of SHU inmates, nor were real steps taken by CDCR to
enact future change. 199 However, in August the California Assembly
exerted pressure on CDCR by holding a hearing on prisoner
isolation which brought academics, community members, and
CDCR officials to Sacramento. Thus, at the end of the second hunger
strike in October, CDCR revealed that it would review the status of
every SHU prisoner being held on basis of gang affiliation. It is
likely that CDCR's decision to finally review SHU policies was
related to the pressure exerted by the legislature, which in turn took
interest because of publicity from the hunger strike. Therefore,
while CDCR has the most direct control over SHU policies it has
demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm in improving the quality of life of
inmates, and there is no reason to expect a departure from this trend.
The judiciary is well-suited to bring about necessary change in
the operation of administrative isolation units. Since individual
complaints are brought to the courts, judges lack the distance from
the reality of the SHU that plagues legislators, and judges lack the
conflict of interest present when departments of corrections must
weigh the safety of staff against the needs of inmates. Additionally,
the judiciary has the power to enact sweeping change, although this
change must be within the confines of the facts of individual cases
197. Fagan, supra note 1.
198. Gearing Up for Round 2 of Hunger Strike, CDCR Threatens Strikers, supra note 12.
199. Id.
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and existing statutes and constitutional provisions.
In recent years courts have demonstrated considerable power
and will in regards to upholding the rights of prisoners. In 1995,
inmates at Pelican Bay filed a suit against the California Department
of Corrections challenging the conditions of their confinement. 200 In
a landmark decision, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held that CDCR's policies inflicted
unnecessary pain through excessive force and deprived inmates of
adequate health care. In addition, the court held that the SHU
inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on mentally ill prisoners and
some methods of gang member validation violated due process. 201
Additionally, in 2011 the U.S. Supreme Court heard Brown v. Plata,
where mentally ill inmates claimed that California's prisons were
overcrowded in excess of constitutional requirements. 202 The Court
held in favor of the prisoners, and mandated a population limit on
California's prisons. 203
There is room for courts to further protect the rights of SHU
inmates. There are many issues left to be tested in the courts to
challenge CDCR's policies, including the deprivation of human
interaction. There has been much research on the effects of
deprivation of human contact and the ill effects of such long-term
isolation on an individual. 204 Indeed, some courts have found
human interaction to be a "basic human need." 2 05 The deprivation
of a "basic human need" is no small matter, so this matter should be
litigated in the form of an Eighth Amendment claim to determine
whether long-term isolation constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. This issue could be used to grant inmates interaction
with each other and greater interaction with their loved ones in the
outside world, and provide a means to attain most of the hunger-
strike demands.
200. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
201. Id. at 1279-80.
202. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1917 (2011).
203. Id.
204. Laura Matter, Hey, I Think We're Unconstitutionally Alone Now: The Eighth
Amendment Protects Social Interaction as a Basic Human Need, 14 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST.
265, 298-99 (2010).
205. Id. at 299.
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Conclusion
Solitary confinement has been a part of prisons since the
appearance of the first modem penitentiaries. However, those early
prisons sought to rehabilitate through isolation, whereas the past
few decades have seen the development of long-term isolation in the
total absence of rehabilitative goals. The year 2011 featured two
large-scale hunger strikes in California prisons, demanding a change
in policies of secure housing units. Many of the policies
implemented in administrative isolation units across the country,
and especially California, are questionable at best. CDCR claims that
SHUs exist exclusively to increase security; however, it is unclear
that many of these policies actually further that goal. In the
aggregate, these policies create an environment that pushes
prisoners to the limits of constitutional protectionS206 and what a
human can endure. There are changes to SHU policies that can be
adopted to create a more livable setting without compromising the
necessary security protocols. All three branches of government hold
the power to bring about important change; however, the courts are
especially well-suited to this task.
Epilogue
After this writing the California Department of Corrections
released the policy review memo promised to the hunger strikers.
The memo proposes no drastic SHU reforms, and many of the
proposed policies could be implemented in ways that either
maintain the status quo or make important improvements to the
conditions that SHU inmates live in.20 7 Furthermore, the memo
remains a proposal, so none of its content is binding, and it is even
possible that none of it will ultimately be adopted. Nonetheless, it is
worthwhile to discuss this document because any immediate SHU
reform in California will likely be based on it.
The memo recommends new gang validation categories. 208 The
validation categories of "gang member" and "gang associate"
206. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1279-80.
207. See generally CDCR, Security Threat Group Prevention, Identification and
Management Strategy (2012).
208. Id. at 15.
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remain relatively unchanged; however, two new categories of "gang
suspect" and "monitored" were introduced. 209 A gang suspect is
someone for whom there is not enough evidence to validate as a
gang member or associate. 210 The new rules would allow suspects to
be tracked for "intelligence purposes." 211 A monitored individual is
someone who has completed the Step Down Program to be released
from the SHU, and the monitored status would allow CDCR great
latitude to search the inmate's cell and belongings. 212 Thus the new
categories will increase the number of inmates that CDCR can keep
under surveillance because the criteria for such close supervision
have been expanded. Inmates who go through the current
debriefing process rather than the Step Down Program would not be
given the monitored status, likely as an incentive to divulge gang
secrets. Essentially, these new validation categories provide no new
rights to prisoners, and exist only to assist CDCR in its surveillance
of prisoners by increasing the pool of inmates who can be tracked for
"intelligence purposes."
The more noteworthy validation proposal is a system which
assigns point values to various pieces of evidence linking a prisoner
to a gang, and requires a total of ten points before an inmate can be
labeled a gang member or associate and sent to the SHU.213 It is
unlikely that this new system would provide any drastic change to
the validation process, because the procedure leaves too much
subjective control to prison officials. Also, it should be noted that
the assignment of points is not intuitive. For example, an inmate's
self-admission of gang membership is worth only five points, while
a tattoo (which cannot be removed, even if the inmate has left the
gang) is worth six points.214 Meanwhile, symbols (which differ only
from tattoos in that they are not marked directly onto the body) are
worth only two points. This system defies logic because nothing
should be a more powerful indicator of gang affiliation than an
uncoerced admission from the inmate, and the rules should account
for the permanence of tattoos. Nonetheless, the point system is a
209. Id. at 17-18.
210. CDCR, supra note 207, at 18.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 16.
214. Idat 23-24.
362 [Vol. 10
positive change because it standardizes and quantifies the validation
process and reduces the possibility of abuse of discretion by prison
administrators in assigning inmates to the SHU, and provides more
concrete factors upon which to review classification decisions.
The other significant proposal is to introduce a "Step Down
Program," through which SHU inmates can earn their way into a
general population prison through good behavior over a period of
several years. 215  Under the four-step program, inmates who
maintain "acceptable behavior" and refrain from criminal gang
behavior for twelve months are eligible to move to the next step.216
All SHU inmates start at step one, and as they move through the
steps they are given incremental privileges such as increased canteen
draws, phone calls, and personal belongings. 217 However, the
changes between steps one and three are minor, and only upon
reaching step four is an inmate allowed social interaction with other
prisoners. 218 The most significant aspect of this proposal is that it
provides inmates with a way out of the SHU that circumvents the
debriefing process. However, in order to capitalize on the reform,
inmates would have to maintain "acceptable behavior" for four
consecutive years. Thus the real magnitude of this change will
depend on how it is implemented, and what is found to constitute
"acceptable behavior."
In sum, the memo proposes important changes and overall
represents movement in the right direction. However the changes
are less significant than would have been hoped for after a summer
that saw two major hunger strikes and drew significant public
interest.
215. CDCR, supra note 207, at 27.
216. Id. at 28.
217. Id. at 28-35.
218. Id.
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